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Abstract
Background: Hospital preparedness is critical for the early detection and management of public
health emergency (PHE). Understanding the current status of PHE preparedness is the first step in
planning to enhance hospitals' capacities for emergency response. The objective of this study is to
understand the current status of hospital PHE preparedness in China.
Methods: Four hundred hospitals in four city and provinces of China were surveyed using a
standardized questionnaire. Data related to hospital demographic data; PHE preparation; response
to PHE in community; stockpiles of drugs and materials; detection and identification of PHE;
procedures for medical treatment; laboratory diagnosis and management; staff training; and risk
communication were collected and analyzed.
Results: Valid responses were received from 318 (79.5%) of the 400 hospitals surveyed. Of the
valid responses, 264 (85.2%) hospitals had emergency plans; 93.3% had command centres and
personnel for PHE; 22.9% included community organisations during the training for PHE; 97.4%
could transport needed medical staff to a PHE; 53.1% had evaluated stockpiles of drugs; 61.5% had
evaluated their supply systems; 55.5% had developed surveillance systems; and 74.6% could
monitor the abnormity(See in appendix). Physicians in 80.2% of the analyzed hospitals reported up-
to-date knowledge of their institution's PHE protocol. Of the 318 respondents, 97.4% followed
strict laboratory regulations, however, only about 33.5% had protocols for suspected samples.
Furthermore, only 59.0% could isolate and identify salmonella and staphylococcus and less than 5%
could isolate and identify human H5N1 avian flu and SARS. Staff training or drill programs were
reported in 94.5% of the institutions; 50.3% periodically assessed the efficacy of staff training; 45%
had experts to provide psychological counselling; 12.1% had provided training for their medical staff
to assess PHE-related stress. All of the above capacities related to the demographic characteristics
of hospitals and will be discussed in-depth in this paper.
Conclusion: Our survey suggested that, at the time of the survey, hospital preparedness for PHE
in China was at an early stage of development. Comprehensive measures should be taken to
enhance hospital capacity in the prevention and management of PHE.
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Background
Public health emergency (PHE) is an event or events that
cause or may cause harm to the health of a community or
nation [1]. To prevent and/or minimize the harm caused
by PHE, early detection and management are necessary.
As hospitals are the main location for PHE surveillance
and treatment, their preparedness is critical for PHE's
early detection and management [2]. Evaluating the cur-
rent status of PHE preparedness within the hospital sys-
tem is the first step in improving a nation's preparedness
for a PHE. Yet, there is no national data on China's hospi-
tal PHE preparedness capacity aside from two studies that
addressed the issues at local level [3,4]. To understand the
current status of hospital PHE preparedness in China, a
sample survey of hospitals in four representative city/
provinces were conducted between November 2004 and
March 2005.
Methods
Study design
The survey used a cross-sectional study design to survey
hospitals in different regions of China. Respondents were
all secondary and tertiary hospitals(the detail of hospital
classification see in appendix) in the city of Beijing and
provinces of Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan. The selec-
tion of hospitals in these four regions is intended to rep-
resent a variety of regional economic status. Broadly
speaking, Beijing and Shandong are economically well
developed, Hainan moderately developed, and Guangxi
developing [5]. According to the Hospital Classification
Method issued by the National Bureau of Statistics of
China, the surveyed hospitals included general hospitals,
hospitals of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), hospi-
tals of integrated traditional Chinese medicine and west-
ern medicine (TCM-WM), specialized hospitals,
community health center, and medical emergency center
(the definition of community health center and medical
emergency center see in appendix) [6]. Four hundred sec-
ondary and tertiary hospitals were surveyed. The study
was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of
the School of Basic Medicine, Peking Union Medical Col-
lege in Beijing, China.
Survey instruments
Based on a literature and government document review, a
detailed methodological approach for research frame-
work and questionnaire development was followed to
inform the development of this study [3]. An indicator
system framework was created and questionnaire
designed based on the framework. The questionnaire con-
sists of 17 sections and 192 items. The questionnaire and
the survey protocol (including field work manual and
quality control procedures) were tested by a pilot study.
For the purpose of this study, we analyzed the data
focused on the following nine areas of interest: (1) hospi-
tal's demographic data (including region, SARS crisis
experience, teaching function, hospital type, and number
of medical staff in related departments); (2) hospital PHE
preparation (emergency plans, response initiating time,
accessibility, and revision and implementation of emer-
gency plan); (3) response to a community PHE (coopera-
tion with local organizations, relationship with the
community PHE network, medical treatment, and rescue
work in the community); (4) stockpiles of drugs and
materials (stockpiles of drugs and other resources and per-
sonal protective equipment); (5)PHE detection and iden-
tification (syndrome surveillance); (6) procedures for
medical treatment (protocol for diagnosis, treatment, and
transfer of PHE victims); (7) laboratory diagnosis and
management (laboratory regulation and management
system, sample disposal and evaluation system, collection
and disposal of suspected samples, and diagnosis of path-
ogen/etiology); (8) staff training (organization of PHE
training, current training of medical staff, curriculum
development and training effectiveness assessment); and
(9) risk communication (organization for communica-
tion of risk psychological counseling to victim and medi-
cal staff, and communication with public). Excluding
aspect 1, items 2–9 (covering 88 survey questions) repre-
sent 8 types of PHE preparedness capacities. Each
answered item was scored 1 for "yes" and 0 for "no" or
"unknown". Item scores were calculated by adding
together "yes" answers. Items scores were used as a proxy
for measuring PHE preparedness in an institution. A total
item score was measured by calculating the score across all
8 items. The higher the total item score, the better the hos-
pital PHE preparedness capacity. Further analyses were
conducted to understand the correlation between prepar-
edness capacity and demographic information. The distri-
bution of the related preparedness capacities across 10
categories of PHE [1] and 15 types of etiology was also
assessed.
Data collection procedures
A computerized questionnaire stored in a CD was sent to
the targeted hospitals accompanied by an official letter
from each of the four city and provincial health depart-
ments stating the importance of the survey and requiring
that each hospital designates a department director to be
responsible for coordinating the completion of the ques-
tionnaire. Each returned questionnaire was carefully
reviewed for its completeness and consistency. For those
questionnaires with incomplete and/or inconsistent
responses, one or two follow-up telephone calls were
made to ensure completeness and consistency. The data
from returned questionnaires were then transferred into a
database for analysis.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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Data analysis
A database was set up using Microsoft Excel 2003. Data
was checked, cleaned, and analyzed using SPSS software
version 11.5. Ninety-five percent confidence interval of
means (95% CI) was used to describe PHE preparedness
capacities. Categorical variables were analyzed with fre-
quency and percentage. Comparisons of mean score of
each of eight PHE preparedness capacities among differ-
ent types of hospitals were performed with P < 0.05 as sta-
tistical significance using parameter test (Independent-
Samples T Test (two-tailed) or One-way Analysis of Vari-
ance) and/or non-parameter test (Mann-Whitney Test or
Kruskal-Wallis Test) based on data distribution character-
istics and homogeneity.
Results
Four hundred hospitals responded, with a response rate of
100%. However, seventy-seven questionnaires were
excluded from analysis due to one of the following rea-
sons: (1) if less than 50% of items in the questionnaire
were not answered, or (2) hospital did not meet second-
ary and/or tertiary hospital standard according to the hos-
pital classification system. Therefore, the valid response
rate was 79.5%.
Hospital demographic information
Of analyzed hospitals (318), 29.9% were in Beijing,
24.5% in Shandong, 40.6% in Guangxi and 5.0% in
Hainan. In terms of hospital type, 72.4% were teaching
hospitals. The mean number of physicians and nurses per
hospital was 174.5, and the mean number of total medi-
cal staff per hospital was 206.1. The mean number of phy-
sicians and nurses in emergency department and
infectious-disease department were 24.3 and 12.0, respec-
tively. Table 1 shows the demographic characteristics of
the analyzed hospitals.
Hospital PHE preparation (Capacity 1)
Of 318 hospitals, 264(85.2%) had an emergency plan.
Among the 264 hospitals that had an emergency plan,
92.6% reported that the institution possessed a protocol
to initiate the emergency plan, 75.5% had a classification
system for different PHE events, 55.3% had evaluated and
revised their emergency plan at least once, and 79.6%
reported that their emergency plan was accessible to all
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the surveyed hospital, Beijing, Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan, China, 2004–2005 (N = 318)
Variables Tertiary
grade A1
Tertiary
grade B1
Secondary
grade A1
Secondary
grade B1
Total4
Region 318
Beijing 34 3 53 5 95
Hainan 5 0 6 5 16
Shandong 16 10 38 14 78
Guangxi 20 8 91 10 129
Fever clinics 316
Yes, designated 50 17 119 25 211
Yes, not designated 4 1 29 3 37
No 20 3 39 6 68
SARS patients admitted2 313
Yes 25 5 38 0 68
No 48 16 147 34 245
Teaching hospitals 315
Yes 68 18 125 17 228
No 6 3 61 17 87
Types of hospital3 297
General hospital 41 12 117 19 189
TCM hospital 8 4 25 4 41
TCM-WM hospital 1 1 5 0 7
Specialized hospital 18 4 30 6 58
Community health center 0 0 1 0 1
Emergency center 1 0 0 0 1
1The hospital classification system, see in the study design section.
2SARS patient admitted means the status whether the hospital admitted SARS patients during SARS crisis in 2003.
3Types of hospital, see in the study design section.
4Some total number of hospitals may not be 318 due to the missing values.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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medical staff. As for organizational preparation, 93.3% of
hospitals with an active emergency plan had a command
center and designated personnel for PHE situations. There
were statistical significance among tertiary grade A hospi-
tals (95% CI: 9.8,10.9) and secondary grade B ones(95%
CI:7.0,9.3), tertiary grade B hospitals(95% CI:9.8,11.9)
and secondary grade B ones. Comparison of eight aspects
PHE preparedness capacities among different types of
hospitals are showed in table 2 and table 3.
Response to PHE in community (Capacity 2)
Of all analyzed respondents, 64.2% were designated as
the local emergency hospital for PHE patient admissions
and 53.0% of them were the designated hospitals to pro-
vide medical rescue services during a national disaster. Of
all analyzed respondents, 97.4% could promptly trans-
port needed medical staff to the PHE field, 84.5%
reported that they were prepared to respond to the needs
of vulnerable people (including women, children, preg-
nant women and the disabled) during a PHE, however,
only 49.8% had evaluated their ability to increase beds
and equipment for PHE. When performing a PHE prepar-
edness drill, 22.9% of respondents reported that they
would invite relevant community organizations to partic-
ipate. With regard to capacity comparison, the statistics
test showed: the total item score of hospitals in Bei-
jing(95% CI:5.9,6.9) was lower than that of hospitals in
Shandong (95% CI:7.0,7.9) and Guangxi(95%
CI:6.7,7.4); the score of teaching hospitals(95%
CI:7.0,7.5) was higher than that of non-teaching hospi-
tals(95% CI:5.7,6.6); and the score of tertiary grade A
(95% CI:6.8,8.0) and B (95% CI:6.7,8.4) hospitals was
higher than that of secondary grade B ones(95%
CI:5.4,6.9), respectively. Among all types of hospitals,
community health center scored highest on this aspect.
Stockpiles of drugs and materials (Capacity 3)
Our results revealed that 53.1% of respondents had eval-
uated their stockpiles of drugs, and 61.5% had established
a relationship with suppliers to provide emergency drug-
Table 2: Comparison of eight aspects PHE preparedness capacities (capacity 1 to 4) among different characteristics of hospitals, 
Beijing, Guangxi, and Shandong, Hainan, China, 2004–2005 (N = 318)
Variables Number Capacity 1
95% CI
Capacity 2
95% CI
Capacity 3
95% CI
Capacity 4
95% CI
Region Beijing 95 9.6,10.6 5.9,6.9* 5.8,6.9** 5.4,6.3
Hainan 16 6.9,9.8 5.4,8.0* 4.8,7.8** 3.9,6.9
Shandong 78 9.0,10.3 7.0,7.9* 6.6,7.9** 5.2,6.3
Guangxi 129 9.2,10.2 6.7,7.4* 5.4,6.4** 5.4,6.2
Classification Tertiary
grade A
75 9.8,10.9** 6.8,8.0* 6.6,7.9** 5.6,6.6*
Tertiary
grade B
21 9.8,11.9** 6.7,8.4* 6.3,9.0** 5.6,7.3*
Secondary
grade A
188 9.3,10.1** 6.5,7.1* 5.8,6.6** 5.4,6.0*
Secondary
grade B
34 7.0,9.3** 5.4,6.9* 3.9,6.0** 4.1,5.9*
Teaching hospital Yes 228 9.6,10.3** 7.0,7.5** 6.4,7.1 5.6,6.2
No 87 8.7,9.9** 5.7,6.6** 5.0,6.1 5.1,6.0
Type General hospital 189 9.7,10.5** 7.0,7.6 6.2,7.0 5.5,6.2
TCM hospital 41 8.4,10.2** 5.5,6.9 5.1,6.8 5.3,6.7
TCM-WM hospital 7 7.7,14.5** 5.6,9.8 5.1,11.7 6.0,8.3
Specialized hospital 58 8.5,10.0** 5.8,6.8 5.2,6.8 4.7,6.0
Community health center 1 --** -- -- --
Emergency center 1 --** -- -- --
SARS patients admitted Yes 68 9.8,10.9 6.3,7.4 6.0,7.3 5.3,6.4
No 245 9.3,10.0 6.7,7.3 6.0,6.7 5.5,6.1
† *0.01 < p < 0.05, **p ≤ 0.01; 95% CI: 95% confidence interval of means.
‡ Capacity1: Hospital PHE preparation (highest score = 13); Capacity2: Response to PHE in community (highest score = 11); Capacity 3: Stockpiles 
of drugs and materials (highest score = 12); Capacity4: Detection and identification of PHE (highest score = 8).
§The post-hoc multiple significant comparison shows that: Capacity1 (Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade B; Secondary grade B vs Tertiary grade 
B; Secondary grade A vs Secondary grade B; General hospital vs Specialized hospital); Capacity2 (Beijing vs Shandong; Beijing vs Guangxi; Tertiary 
grade A vs Secondary grade B; Secondary grade B vs Tertiary grade B); Capacity3 (Beijing vs Shandong; Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade A; 
Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade B; Tertiary grade B vs Secondary grade A; Tertiary grade B vs Secondary grade B; Secondary grade A vs 
Secondary grade B); Capacity4 (Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade B; Tertiary grade B vs Secondary grade B).BMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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supplies, however, only 43.2% had signed written con-
tracts with suppliers. Of all analyzed respondents, 47.8%
had drug-distribution plans, and 21.5% knew where the
national or local pharmacy distribution centers were
located. In regards to other medical materials, 80.1% had
stockpiles of materials for responding to PHE. As for the
stockpiles of drugs for infectious diseases, about 93.2%,
91.9% and 43.5% of responding hospitals had drug stock-
piles for treating infectious diarrhea, influenza and botu-
lismo toxin, respectively. When hospitals were compared
on this item, statistical analysis showed that institutions
in Beijing (95% CI:5.8,6.9) had a higher score than that of
Shandong (95% CI:6.6,7.9). Tertiary hospitals generally
had a higher score than secondary ones.
PHE detection and identification (Capacity 4)
Among all the respondents, 55.5% reported that they had
developed syndromic surveillance systems for certain dis-
eases and 84.4% required that physicians on duty should
report any abnormity to the hospital's presidents (the def-
inition of abnormity see in appendix). Abnormity in
admission diagnosis, routine microbiological tests, emer-
gency room patients, and death with unknown causes
were systematically monitored by 74.6% of institutions
and 47.4% of hospitals shared their surveillance informa-
tion with the local health authority. There were statisti-
cally significant differences between tertiary grade
hospitals (Grade A 95% CI: 5.6,6.6; Grade B 95% CI:
5.6,7.3) and secondary grade B hospitals (95% CI:4.1,5.9)
for this capacity, with tertiary hospitals scoring higher on
their ability to detect and identify a PHE.
Procedures for medical treatment (Capacity 5)
Physicians in 80.2% of the responding institutions
reported being familiarized with the latest treatment pro-
tocol for a PHE, 92.8% could transfer PHE victims to cor-
responding medical agencies for appropriate treatment,
and 98.0% could provide training on the protocol system.
However, only 69.0% had specific procedures for patient
transfer in a PHE. As for infectious disease treatment pro-
tocol, 80.1% had protocols for SARS, but only 37.3% for
brucellosis. With regard to the capacity comparison
Table 3: Comparison of eight aspects PHE preparedness capacities (capacity 5 to 8) among different characteristics of hospitals, 
Beijing, Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan, China, 2004–2005 (N = 318)
Variables Number Capacity 5
95% CI
Capacity 6
95% CI
Capacity 7
95% CI
Capacity 8
95% CI
Region Beijing 95 6.5,8.1** 4.0,4.9 5.7,6.6* 3.4,4.4**
Hainan 16 5.4,9.9** 3.6,5.6 4.2,7.5* 2.2,5.3**
Shandong 78 8.8,10.7** 4.4,5.4 5.9,7.0* 4.6,6.2**
Guangxi 129 8.5,9.8** 4.0,4.6 5.1,6.0* 3.2,4.1**
Classification Tertiary grade A 75 8.2,10.2* 4.6,5.7** 5.9,7.0 4.7,6.0**
Tertiary grade B 21 8.6,11.4* 4.4,5.9** 4.9,7.1 4.2,6.9**
Secondary grade A 188 8.0,9.2* 4.1,4.6** 5.6,6.2 3.2,4.0**
Secondary grade B 34 5.5,8.3* 2.6,3.9** 4.3,6.1 2.8,4.8**
Teaching hospital Yes 228 8.6,9.6* 4.4,5.0 5.8,6.4 4.0,4.8
No 87 6.8,8.5* 3.6,4.4 5.2,6.2 3.1,4.3
Type General hospital 189 8.7,9.9** 4.5,5.0 5.9,6.5 3.7,4.5
TCM hospital 41 7.3,9.6** 3.7,4.7 4.6,6.2 2.9,4.7
TCM-WM hospital 7 8.9,13.7** 1.6,7.0 3.6,8.7 1.9,8.7
Specialized hospital 58 5.5,7.7** 3.4,4.4 5.0,6.4 3.9,5.5
Community health center 1 --** -- -- --
Emergency center 1 --** -- -- --
SARS patients admitted Yes 68 7.6,9.6 4.3,5.3* 5.9,6.8 3.1,4.3
No 245 8.2,9.3 4.2,4.7* 5.6,6.2 3.9,4.7
† *0.01 < p < 0.05, **p < 0.01; 95% CI: 95% confidence interval of means.
‡ Capacity 5: Procedures for medical treatment (highest score = 15); Capacity 6: Laboratory diagnosis and management (highest score = 9); 
Capacity 7: Staff training (highest score = 9); Capacity 8: Risk communication (highest score = 11).
§ The post-hoc multiple significant comparison shows that: Capacity5 (Beijing vs Shandong; Beijing vs Guangxi; Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade 
B; Secondary grade B vs Tertiary grade B; Secondary grade A vs Secondary grade B; General hospital vs Specialized hospital; TCM hospital vs 
Specialized hospital; TCM-WM hospital vs Specialized hospital); Capacity6 (Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade A; Tertiary grade A vs Secondary 
grade B; Tertiary grade B vs Secondary grade B); Capacity7 (Shandong vs Guangxi);Capacity8 (Beijing vs Shandong; Hainan vs Shandong; Guangxi vs 
Shandong; Tertiary grade A vs Secondary grade A; Secondary grade B vs Tertiary grade A; Tertiary grade B vs Secondary grade A; Tertiary grade B 
vs Secondary grade B).BMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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between evaluated hospitals, statistical analysis revealed
that hospitals in Shandong (95% CI:8.8,10.7) and
Guangxi (95% CI:8.5,9.8) scored higher than those of Bei-
jing (95% CI:6.5,8.1). Furthermore, TCM-WM hospitals
(95% CI:8.9,13.7) scored higher than all other types of
institutions. Tertiary grade hospitals (Grade A 95%
CI:8.2,10.2; Grade B 95% CI: 8.6,11.4) and teaching hos-
pitals (95% CI:8.6,9.6) had better score than secondary
grade B (95% CI:5.5,8.3)and non-teaching institutions
(95% CI:6.8,8.5), respectively.
Laboratory diagnosis and management (Capacity 6)
We selected 15 kinds of infectious diseases/etiologies on
which to assess laboratory diagnosis capacity, medical
treatment procedures, and drug stockpile for infectious
disease control. Our results showed that 59.0% of
responding hospitals could isolate and identify salmo-
nella and staphylococcus, but less than 5% reported that
they could isolate and identify human H5N1 avian flu
and SARS. The results are listed in table 4. As for the man-
agement of laboratory of results, 97.4% of respondents
had strict laboratory operational regulations and 96.4%
had personnel specially assigned to laboratory manage-
ment. When faced with an emergency, 76.7% could
promptly enlarge the capacity of sample disposal, while
only 33.5% had protocols to collect suspected samples.
Disposal and transportation of suspected samples capa-
bilities were 33.5% and 32.6%, respectively, but once lab-
oratories were contaminated, only 9.1% had alternatives.
Statistical analysis showed that tertiary-grade A (95%
CI:4.6,5.7) and B (95% CI:4.4,5.9) hospitals and hospi-
tals with experience of SARS patients (95% CI:4.3,5.3)
scored higher than those secondary-grade and without
experience (95% CI:4.2,4.7), respectively.
Staff training (Capacity 7)
Among all the respondents, 94.5% reported that they had
a training program for the following medical staff: infec-
tion managers (56.3%); emergency department physi-
cians and nurses (92.2%); and infectious disease ward
physicians and nurses (71.8%). Staff training was super-
vised by a designated person in 82.3% of institutions and
65.8% had training curriculums, 66.5% of which was
updated regularly. Effectiveness of PHE training was peri-
odically assessed in 50.3% of respondents. For this capac-
ity, statistical significance indicated that respondents in
Shandong (95% CI:5.9,7.0) scored higher than participat-
ing institutions in Guangxi (95% CI:5.1,6.0).
Risk communication (Capacity 8)
Of all respondents, 45.0% possessed expert panels to
advise on PHE psychological counseling for medical staff
and PHE victims. Medical staff in 12.1% of the analyzed
hospitals were trained to assess the psychological impact
of PHE. If a PHE occurred, participating hospitals could:
counsel victims and their family members (43.6%); offer
teaching materials (51.0%); access additional psychologi-
cal consultants (19.3%). With regards to communication
capabilities, 39.4% of hospitals reported a mass media
communication protocol, 43.9% possessed a designated
spokesperson to deliver PHE information to the public,
and 30.8% possessed personnel specially assigned to
communicate information to the media, public, and local
governments. Statistical analysis showed that hospitals in
Shandong (95% CI:4.6,6.2) scored higher than those in
Beijing (95% CI:3.4,4.4), Guangxi (95% CI:3.2,4.1) and
Hainan (95% CI:2.2,5.3) on this capacity, with tertiary-
grade hospitals (Grade A 95% CI: 4.7,6.0; Grade B 95%
Table 4: The laboratory diagnosis capacity, medical treatment procedures and drug stockpile for 15 types of etiology in respondent 
hospitals, Beijing, Shandong, Guangxi, Hainan, China, 2004–2005 (N = 318)
Varieties of etiology Laboratory diagnosis capacity Medical treatment procedures Drug stockpile
No. "yes" % No. "yes" % No. "yes" %
SARS 9 3.1 241 80.1 252 80.8
Plague 28 9.8 136 47.6 149 49.0
Cholera 145 49.3 175 60.8 194 63.6
Anthrax 49 16.9 110 38.6 140 46.4
Brucellosis 43 15.0 106 37.3 134 44.8
Meningococcal meningitis 98 33.6 203 68.4 237 77.2
Japanese encephalitis B 43 14.8 203 69.0 242 79.1
Influenza 43 14.6 234 78.8 285 91.9
Human H5N1 avian flu 6 2.1 197 67.0 182 60.1
Infectious diarrhea 77 60.4 225 77.1 288 93.2
Food poisoning of staphylococcus 172 58.7 187 64.7 259 84.6
Food poisoning of salmonella 174 59.6 184 63.7 255 83.3
Acute organophosphorus poisoning 111 37.8 226 76.6 272 88.3
Botulism toxin poisoning 24 8.3 126 44.5 131 43.5
Tetramine poisoning 18 6.3 162 56.1 162 53.6B
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Table 5: Comparisons of various PHE events and related capacities of all types of hospitals, Beijing, Shandong, Guangxi, and Hainan, China, 2004–2005 (N = 318)
Varieties of PHE Emergency plans included Assessing response to PHE Attending regulation and revision 
of emergency plans in local 
agencies
Having expert lists for following 
situation
Having projects admitting and 
treating following victims
No. "yes" % No. "yes" % No. "yes" % No. "yes" % No. "yes" %
Infectious diseases 
incidence
277 95.5 133 93.7 81 28.2 293 93.3 210 70.7
Unidentified 
population 
diseases
167 62.8 110 79.1 54 19.0 231 75.0 141 48.8
Mass food 
poisoning and 
water pollution
200 73.5 116 82.3 57 20.1 243 79.2 173 59.5
Mass occupational 
poisoning
125 49.2 75 56.8 45 16.0 166 56.5 100 35.3
Outbreak of 
nosocomial 
infection
162 62.8 104 77.0 56 19.9 222 73.8 143 49.8
Mass abnormal 
reaction or death 
resulted from 
drugs or 
vaccination
93 38.0 79 59.8 41 14.5 160 54.8 91 32.4
Incident of 
radioactive or 
poisonous material 
contamination
103 41.4 60 45.8 32 11.4 125 43.1 73 25.9
Biochemical and 
nuclear terrorism
50 20.5 40 30.5 25 8.9 66 23.1 37 13.3
Grave medicine 
accident
203 76.0 115 83.9 58 20.4 237 77.7 158 54.7
Natural disaster 173 67.8 97 70.8 49 17.4 214 71.1 138 48.6BMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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CI: 4.2,6.9) reporting better score than secondary ones
(Grade A 95% CI: 3.2,4.0; Grade B 95% CI: 2.8,4.8).
Comparisons of various PHE contents
Five aspects of preparedness capacities and various PHE
events were described in crosstab, as shown in table 5.
Among all the respondents, 277 hospitals (95.5%) had
emergency plans for infectious epidemics, and 50 ones
(20.5%) for biochemical and nuclear terrorism. Evalua-
tion on infectious epidemic was performed by 93.7%, the
percentage was relatively lower for bio-terrorism and
nuclear terrorism threats (30.5%), In regards to expert
consultation, 28.2% had attended local agency meetings
on regulation and revision of emergency plans for infec-
tious epidemic control and 93.3% had the available
expert list for consultation on infectious epidemic, how-
ever, for terrorism, the percentage was only 23.1%.
Projects for admitting and treating infectious epidemic
victims were common (71%), although only 13.3% of
hospitals were involved in similar plans for dealing with
bio-terror and nuclear threats.
Discussion
Serious PHE concerns were raised in China during the
2003 SARS crisis when it became apparent that hospitals
possessed poor emergency preparedness [7]. Even the up-
coming 2008 Olympics Game in Beijing and the 5.12
Earthquake Disaster in China have dramatically evoked
the awareness of PHE preparedness capacity for hospital.
Based on the experience of the SARS pandemic, all hospi-
tals should possess fundamental PHE programs, includ-
ing preparedness of drugs, equipment, staff, emergency
education and staff training [3,8,9], coordination with rel-
evant community bodies [10], medical treatment [11],
early detection and warning [12], laboratory diagnosis
[13-15] and psychological intervention [8]. Since the
SARS crisis, the central Chinese government has become
more active in the construction of public health system,
especially in regards to the medical emergency response
system [16]. One major effort involved a 11.4 billion RMB
investment in local governments to initiate the construc-
tion of regional PHE medical treatment systems [17]. In
order to offer some insight into the development of hos-
pital PHE preparedness capacity, this study examined the
current status of hospital preparedness in Beijing, Shan-
dong, Guangxi, and Hainan.
Emergency preparedness refers to the processes involved
in ensuring an institution: (1) has complied with the pre-
ventive measures; (2) is in a state of readiness to contain
the effects of a forecasted disastrous event in order to min-
imize loss of life, injury, and damage to property; (3) can
provide rescue, relief, rehabilitation, and other services in
the aftermath of the disaster; and (4) holds the capability
and resources to continue to sustain its essential functions
during a PHE [18]. An emergency preparedness systems
primarily composed of emergency plans and organiza-
tional structures and lays the foundation for dealing with
PHE [19]. Emergency plans establish the protocol for
operation under a PHE [16]. For a hospital to mobilize all
PHE resources in a short period of time, contingency
plans must be issued in advance [9]. In addition, periodic
review and updating of emergency plans enhance an insti-
tution's emergency response capacity [3]. Our study
showed that most hospitals had emergency plans and that
these plans focused on infectious diseases control with
less attention to preparedness for biological, nuclear radi-
ation and other terrorism attacks. Most of the hospitals
had PHE command departments and emergency response
teams, however, only 55.3% of hospitals with emergency
plans reported they had evaluated and revised their PHE
systems. Overall, tertiary hospitals performed better in
PHE preparation than secondary hospitals. Meanwhile,
no statistical significance was found between hospitals
that had admitted SARS patients and those that had not,
suggesting that after the SARS crisis, all hospitals raised
awareness of emergency plans and implementation.
No hospital or medical system can manage a public health
emergency without community networks and public
involvement. Therefore, hospitals need to communicate
and cooperate with other local health agencies, function-
ing as a networked public health provider. Problems like
lack of communication and coordination between hospi-
tal departments and inter-agency networks hinder the
availability of resources in a community and limit timely
forecasting, public communication and effective regula-
tion of a PHE [10]. Our survey revealed that if a PHE
occurred, most of hospitals reported that they could take
responsibility for PHE rescue service, transport the medi-
cal staff in a timely manner, and provide priority health
services to vulnerable populations. Yet, less than one third
of respondents attended regulation and revision work-
shops for emergency plans for infectious epidemic control
held by local agencies. This lack of cross-institutional
interaction indicated that the ability of hospitals to coor-
dinate with community agencies in preparation for, or in
the event of a PHE was generally poor. The survey showed
that among all the types of respondents community
health center were best able to respond to PHE and the
respondents with multiple functions performed better
suggesting that communication and coordination
between hospitals and community agencies should be
strengthened.
Characteristics of a PHE include suddenness and unpre-
dictability [9]. For most hospitals, medicine storage may
be in great demand when faced with a sudden increase in
patients. Therefore, hospitals must have programs to
ensure appropriate levels of emergency supplies includingBMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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drugs, medical equipment, electricity, water and oxygen,
disinfectant, etc. Our survey suggested that most of the
hospitals could establish an emergency-drug-supply sys-
tem for most of the infectious diseases we addressed in the
questionnaire except anthrax, brucellosis, botulism toxin
poisoning and tetramine poisoning. For most of surveyed
hospitals possessed emergency resource reserves, but less
than half of them had corresponding drug distribution
programs. In addition, hospital capacity was affected by
economic level and classification of the hospital, suggest-
ing that the importance of local economic development
strengthens hospital ability to provide PHE.
Early detection and identification of a PHE are amongst
the most important objectives for prompt and effective
public health response to a PHE [12] as well as an essen-
tial precondition for selecting appropriate prevention and
treatment measures. This study showed that most of the
hospitals could regularly train medical staff on how to
report and identify suspicious PHE and that the institu-
tions possessed surveillance systems to monitor various
aspects of abnormity. Approximately half of the respond-
ents could share surveillance information with the local
health authorities. There were statistically significant dif-
ferences among various classification of the respondents,
which demonstrated that after the SARS crisis, hospitals at
all levels attached high importance to PHE monitoring
and early warning system, however, the capacity was
affected by the comprehensive strength of hospital.
PHE happens suddenly and its incidence rate is relatively
low, which leaves most medical staff inexperienced and
unprepared [11]. Therefore, it is important that hospitals
develop emergency plans for PHE treatment programs. In
this survey, more than half of respondents showed that
their physicians were aware of current PHE protocols.
Most hospitals had transfer and treating procedures for
infectious diseases, including SARS, influenza, and infec-
tious diarrhea, but less held these procedures for bio-
chemical incidents, leakage of nuclear, and terrorist
attacks. Because they are easily used as biological terrorist
attacks materials [20], therefore, the prevention and con-
trol of these emergencies become very important. Our sta-
tistical analyses showed that tertiary-grade, teaching and
TCM-WM hospitals performed better on medical treat-
ment procedures preparedness, which might reflect the
fact that different types of hospitals have different func-
tions and mission in the community, however, for this
capacity, the statistical significance among different
regions showed the important role that economic factor
plays.
Hospital laboratories not only have the task of clinical
diagnosis, but take some responsibility in the surveillance
of public health [13,14]. Therefore, laboratory informa-
tion plays an important role in detection of the PHE
[13,15]. Detecting PHE related pathogen/etiology can not
only confirm clinical diagnosis, but also identify newly
emerging infectious diseases [15,21]. The presence of
SARS in China in 2003, and the slow response to its emer-
gence, revealed that China's public health laboratory sys-
tems were weak [13]. This survey indicated that many of
the hospitals did not report adequate laboratory diagnos-
tic capacities. Although hospital laboratory regulations
seemed relatively good, only one-third of hospital labora-
tories had programs for dealing with suspicious samples
collecting, disposal and delivery. Only half of the sur-
veyed hospitals could detect food-borne pathogens,
including cholera vibrio, infectious diarrhea, staphyloco-
ccus and salmonella. Few hospitals had the capacity to
detect the airborne pathogens, including brucella, influ-
enza virus, anthrax bacteria, the H5N1 avian flu virus,
plague bacillus, meningitis B virus, SARS virus and other
pathogens. Hospitals with admitting SARS patients per-
formed better showed the importance of the experience of
SARS disposal.
Prior to the 2003 SARS crisis, China had not experiences a
large-scale PHE outbreak for some time. As PHE is a high-
risk event with little probability [22], medical staff often
possess limited awareness of appropriate response and
this contributed to the under-detection of SARS nosoco-
mial infections in 2003 [23]. When PHE occurs, hospital
medical staff are usually the first responders and informa-
tion providers, therefore, education and training are key
measures to enhance PHE response [24]. Our survey sug-
gested that after SARS crisis, most hospitals re-evaluated
the importance of medical staff training for PHE. The
majority of respondents offered training programs to their
related medical staff. However, the effectiveness of these
training programs needs to be periodically evaluated.
PHE can cause psychological as well as physical problems
for the public and medical staff attending to victims
[9,25]. In a public health crisis or emergency, effective risk
communication can help people cope, make decisions,
and return their lives to normal. Crisis communication, as
an important part of a PHE response [8], is key to ensuring
complete, transparent and prompt information exchange,
and to help hospitals make timely responses and reduce
the serious consequences [26]. The results of this survey
revealed that medical staff in 12.1% of the hospitals
underwent training for evaluation of PHE-related stress
and only one-third of respondents had specific programs
and spokespersons for communicating critical messages
and information to the media, public, governments and
stakeholders. These results indicated that most of the sur-
veyed hospitals do not understand the importance of psy-
chological care in a PHE emergency, do not have the
resources to deal with it, or presume that it is not theirBMC Public Health 2008, 8:319 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/319
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place to do so. Indeed, this capacity evaluation revealed
that when a PHE occurred, most hospitals' response plans
focused on physiological medical treatment, but health
education, psychological counseling, and crisis communi-
cation plans were rare. However, for this capacity, the sta-
tistical significance among different regions and levels
showed the important role that economic factor and com-
prehensive level play.
Limitations
The study has several limitations. First of all, the surveyed
hospitals were restricted to four city and provinces, even
some types of hospitals were rare (the number of the sur-
veyed community health center and emergency center was
just one, respectively), therefore, the results may not fully
represent the PHE capacity of all hospitals in China. Sec-
ondly, because of self-report method there may be a
respondent reporting bias. The inclusion of official docu-
ments from respective Health Bureaus, for example, may
have encouraged respondents to complete survey but have
also been interpreted as an official assessment of capacity
leading some hospital representatives to overestimate
PHE capacity. Thirdly, only quantitative data were col-
lected to measure certain capacities of PHE preparedness.
Most questions required a "yes" "no" or "unknown"
answer which restricts the collated data to these three cat-
egories. Finally, this data set is not complete as some hos-
pitals did not respond and others had to be excluded on
the basis of incomplete answers or for ineligibility for hos-
pital classification. To a certain extent, this loss of
respondents caused a loss of information.
Conclusion
After several years of construction and development, the
capability of hospitals in China to deal with PHE, in par-
ticular infectious diseases control, has improved greatly
[3,4]. Nevertheless, this research suggests that China has
more progress to make before PHE preparedness is satis-
factory. To enhance hospital preparation for dealing with
PHE, governments at all levels should increase investment
in the construction of infrastructure to create and sustain
appropriate PHE capacity. On the other hand, hospitals at
all levels should enhance their management, including
updating and revising of emergency plans; strengthening
communication and cooperation with other local agen-
cies; enhancing the capacity of abnormity monitoring and
laboratory diagnostic capability for infectious diseases;
improving the treatment program for various PHE scenar-
ios; and strengthening psychological intervention and risk
communication capabilities. Finally PHE preparedness in
relation to terrorism caused by nuclear radiation and bio-
chemical substance was low in this study and should be
further assessed for areas of need and improvement.
Appendix
Abnormity: Abnormity means the rapid increase of emer-
gency room patients with acute asthma, flu, fever of
unknown causes.
Hospital classification: According to "the hospital classifi-
cation system" of the Ministry of Health of People's
Republic of China, all hospitals in China are classified
into primary, secondary, and tertiary hospitals based on
their functions in providing medical care, medical educa-
tion, and conducting medical research. A secondary hos-
pital is defined as a regional hospital that provides
comprehensive medical care, medical education, and
medical research for the region. A tertiary hospital is
defined as cross-regional, providing comprehensive and
specialized medical care with a high level of medical edu-
cation and research functions. Secondary and tertiary hos-
pitals are further classified into subgroups: Grade A, Grade
B, and Grade C according to their service levels, size, med-
ical technology, medical equipment, and management
and medical quality [27].
Community health center: community health center is a
kind of primary health care delivery in China, most of
which are transferred from secondary grade hospitals, and
provide preventive, curative care, maternal and child care,
rehabilitation and health education to local inhabitants
by general practitioners, community nurses and public
health workers.
Medical emergency center: medical emergency center
(First Aid Station) is a kind of emergency health care deliv-
ery in China, which provide emergency care, first aid,
monitoring and treatment for all those patients with pre-
hospital emergencies.
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